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ABSTRACT
A new Offshore Floating Nuclear Plant (OFNP) concept
with high potential for attractive economics and an unprece-
dented level of safety is presented, along with an overview of
work done in the area of security. The OFNP creatively com-
bines state-of-the-art Light Water Reactors (LWRs) with float-
ing platforms such as those used in offshore oil/gas operations,
both of which are well-established technologies which can al-
low implementation on a time scale consistent with combating
climate change in the near future. OFNP is a plant that can be
entirely built within a floating platform in a shipyard, transferred
to the site. OFNP eliminates earthquakes and tsunamis as acci-
dent precursors; its ocean-based passive safety systems eliminate
the loss of ultimate heat sink accident by design. The defense of
an OFNP poses new security opportunities and challenges com-
pared to land-based plants. Such a plant can be more easily de-
fended by virtue of the clear 360 degree lines of sight and the
relative ease of identifying surface threats. Conversely the off-
shore plant is potentially vulnerable to underwater approaches by
mini-submarines and divers. We investigate security considera-
tions of the OFNP applicable to two potential plant options, an
OFNP-300 with a 300 MWe reactor, and an OFNP-1100 with an
1100 MWe reactor. Three innovative security system approaches
could be combined for the offshore plant. The first is a com-
prehensive detection system which integrates radar, sonar and
unmanned vehicles for a long distance overview of the vicinity
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of the plant. The second approach is the use of passive physical
barriers about 100 meters from the plant, which will force a fast-
moving power boat to lose speed or stop at the barrier allowing
the plant security force more time to respond. The third approach
takes advantage of the offshore plant siting and the monthly or
biweekly rotation of crew to reduce the total on-plant and on-
shore security force by using the off-duty security force on the
plant as a reserve force. Through the use of these approaches, the
OFNP-300 should be able to achieve a similar security cost (on
a per Megawatt basis) as land-based plants of similar or some-
what larger power rating. Due to non-linear scaling of cost, the
security cost of the OFNP-1100 has the potential to be reduced
significantly compared to its land-based equivalents.
1 Introduction
Despite the promise of the Nuclear Renaissance in the
2000s, rising capital costs, delays in the construction of currently
ordered nuclear plants and the very low cost of natural gas have
combined to severely reduce the number of ordered new nuclear
power plants in the US as well as cause the closing of existing
plants due to high cost of upgrading and repair of technology.
The concept for the Offshore Floating Nuclear Plant (OFNP) has
several advantages relative to these issues, including the reduc-
tion in expensive structural concrete needed, the use of the ocean
as an infinitely available ultimate heat sink, and, perhaps most
appealingly in the wake of Fukushima, inherent protection from
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FIGURE 1. OFNP-300 CYLINDRICAL-HULL DESIGN
earthquake and tsunamis. Additionally offshore siting can elim-
inate the need for evacuation and minimize the degree of land
contamination in the event of a radioactive release. The OFNP
employs a standard nuclear plant on a cylindrical-hull platform
of the type commonly used in oil platforms, as shown in Figure
1. Two designs are being developed in parallel: the OFNP-1100
based on a class 1100MWe reactor such as the Westinghouse
AP 1000 reactor and the OFNP-300 based on a class 300MWe
reactor such as the Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor [1].
Both OFNPs will be sited somewhere between 10 and 12 nauti-
cal miles offshore (the 10-mile minimum ensures an emergency
planning zone with zero residents, the 12-mile maximum is the
territorial waters limit), in water-depth of at least 100 meters.
In the wake of 9/11, there was significant scrutiny on the
security of nuclear plants, as the specter of terrorists destroying
a nuclear plant or stealing nuclear materials was brought into
focus. The offshore siting of the proposed OFNP offers some
advantages, as well as some disadvantages, compared to the se-
curity of a conventional, land-based plant. One major cost driver
for conventional plants is the large size of the security force to
meet the more stringent regulations that have been imposed over
the years since 9/11 and the limited response time available to
mitigate a threat. Consideration of security at this initial stage of
offshore floating plant design helps to lower security costs and
prevent the necessity of having to design security features into
an already designed platform. Ensuring an adequate level of se-
curity is a major design objective for the OFNP concept. The
security plan for this paper applies to both the OFNP-300 and
OFNP-1100, with the various aspects of the plan identified for
both. There are two goals for the security plan. The first is to
be able to detect and assess a threat at a maximum distance and
repel an attack on the plant, and the second is to minimize costs
as possible. The requirements we have suggested here which
the security plan must meet are both those imposed by govern-
mental regulation and those adopted for investment protection.
For governmental regulation we tentatively adopt those of the
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission which would be necessary
for siting in United States waters and serve as an initial surrogate
for regulations which might be imposed by the host country of an
international offshore site. This paper first presents the security
requirements which must be met for current, deterministically-
based USNRC regulations and those that have been selected for
investment protection. The central distinction between these cat-
egories is that the NRCs requirements derive from its statutory
authority which is limited to requiring protection against signif-
icant core damage and spent fuel sabotage, actions which pose
risk to public health and safety, while the second category stems
from the desire that the plant can continue to operate reliably and
generate revenues for its owner. The paper then explains the pro-
posed security features already selected for the OFNP plant and
those key areas such as refueling and maintenance which will
definitely impact achievement of these security requirements but
for which insufficient design work has been performed to date to
enable the security approach to be specified. Finally, the paper
explains security-related cost-saving measures that will be im-
plemented and compares an estimated final cost of a postulated
set of security features on a per Megawatt basis to a conventional,
land-based plant.
2 Offshore Floating Nuclear Plant Concept
MIT is developing two OFNP designs in parallel which
would be used in different markets: the OFNP-300 and OFNP-
1100, designated according to their electric power rating [1]. The
OFNP-1100 is based on a class 1100-MW reactor such as West-
inghouses AP1000 [2], which is already NRC design certified
and being built in the U.S. and China. The OFNP-300 is based
on a class 300-MW reactor, such as Westinghouses Small Mod-
ular Reactor (WSMR) [3]. In both cases, the floating structure
chosen to house the nuclear plant is a cylindrical hull-type plat-
form that shares many of its characteristics with platforms used
in the offshore oil and gas drilling industry. The cylindrical hull
design offers substantial dynamic stability gains at the scale the
OFNP is designed for, when compared to other offshore platform
TABLE 1. OFNP PLATFORM CHARACTERISTICS
Parameter OFNP-300 OFNP-1100
Hull/skirt Diameter(m) 45/75 75/106
Draft(m) 48.5 68
Total Height (m) 73 108
Main Deck Height(m) 12.5 34
Displacement (tonnes) ~115,500 ~376,400
Structural Concrete (ton/MWe) ~2 ~4 *
* Compare to ~69 ton/MWe for the AP1000 plant
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TABLE 2. QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGES OF OFNP WITH RESPECT TO LAND-BASED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Site On-Land Offshore
Licensing Site specific (ground and seismic requirements) Standardized (site-independent design)
Construction At site, requiring enormous amounts of concrete
resulting in high cost and frequent schedule
delays
In centralized shipyard; structural concrete is virtually
eliminated
Ownership and
Operations
Domestic utility owns and operates the plant with
domestically trained workforce
International utility could own and operate a worldwide
fleet of plants, with crews that receive standardized
training and operate in semi-monthly shifts (onboard
living quarters)
Safety Passive safety (new plants); evacuation possibly
needed in case of severe accidents
No loss of heat sink; no earthquake and tsunami
vulnerability; superior defense in depth; no resident
population evacuation needed
Plant lifetime 60 years, all at one site 60 years; can track most profitable markets with minimal
local infrastructure (plug-and-play approach)
Decommissioning At site, decade-long project Immediate return to green field; decommissioning in
shipyard
designs, such as semi-submersibles or floating barges [4–7]. The
cylindrical hull design also enables the reactor and containment
to be located at an elevation below the waterline, which enhances
physical protection from plane crashes and collisions with ships,
while also making it easier to access the ocean heat sink. The
OFNP balance of plant includes a standard Rankine cycle, a step-
up transformer, both located onboard the platform, and several
submarine AC cables to transmit the electric power to the grid on
land [8]. Summary dimensions for the OFNP-300 and OFNP-
1100 platforms are reported in Table 2.
The design philosophy of the OFNP is to:
(i) Use only proven and qualified materials and components,
for both the nuclear island and the floating platform. This
reduces development and licensing costs and schedule, and
maximizes reliability in operations.
(ii) Design the plant for modular, streamlined construction in
existing shipyards. The platform hull, the nuclear island and
the platform topside can be constructed independently (pos-
sibly at different shipyards), and then assembled at a single
shipyard. It is the shipyard capabilities that drive the design
of the plant, not vice versa. This reduces the need for re-
design during construction, and ultimately reduces the con-
struction schedule and uncertainty.
(iii) Systematically integrate multiple functions into single sys-
tems, structures and components that are not safety related.
This makes the plant more compact and efficient without in-
troducing common-cause failure mechanisms in safety sys-
tems. For example, an annular skirt is attached to the bottom
of the platform hull to function as an oscillation dampener,
but also to provide extra buoyancy during transportation of
the platform.
More information on the OFNP design can be found in Ref-
erence [9]. The OFNP concept affords several advantages and
flexibilities in construction, operations, safety and decommis-
sioning that are not possible with traditional land-based nuclear
power plants, as described in Table 2. This paper focuses on the
OFNP security principles and their implementation in the OFNP
design.
3 Overview of Challenges
Although there are some similarities, for the most part the
security situation of a land-based plant is very different from that
for an offshore plant. The underwater dimension of an offshore
plant creates a new challenge for defending the OFNP, as does
the possibility of collisions with large vessels and the need to
prevent sinking. On the other hand, the clear 360 degree lines of
sight and relative ease of detecting and identifying surface threats
at distances can help afford adequate response time to mitigate
the threat. The most analogous offshore installation is an oil
platform, but due to the relative lack of importance oil platforms
place on security compared to that which is required for a nuclear
plant, it is not an entirely informative comparison [10]. Rather,
two more useful security plans to examine are those around ports
and those around naval vessels in port. While both have their
own differences from the security needed for this reactor plat-
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form, nonetheless, a comparison is instructive.
Both ports and naval vessels utilize floating booms to encir-
cle vulnerable areas and create a standoff distance between them
and a potential attacker. In addition, both utilize detection mea-
sures to attempt to identify potential threats before they become
threats. The responses of both of these to two specific threats
that are unique to an offshore environment are instructive. The
first unique threat is that of underwater attack, such as a diver or
a submersible. Both ports and naval vessels use sonar to detect a
diver or other underwater threat. In addition, both use underwa-
ter netting to deny access for divers to vulnerable areas, whether
that be the hull itself for a naval vessel or a restricted part of the
port. For ports and naval vessels alike, the response to the second
unique threat, a potential ship collision threat, is, first, to detect
the vessel, identify, communicate and warn away the approach-
ing vessel, then, second, attempt to intercept and stop it, and or
use barriers to deflect or halt it, and, third, design for collision
resistance. A similar approach will be developed for the OFNP
and addressed more fully in the future.
Security costs make up an important proportion of the cost
for conventional, land-based reactors, and the OFNP should be
designed with security in mind in order to reduce unnecessary
costs. Hardware costs are one-time costs, although the necessi-
ties of maintenance and replacement will add a small recurring
cost to that total, and both those one-time costs and the main-
tenance costs are relatively small compared to the cost of main-
taining the security force. This will be even truer for an offshore
plant, as, just as with an oil platform, the costs for an employee
on the platform will be significantly higher than for an equiva-
lent employee who works on land. Therefore, personnel require-
ments will be the driver of total security cost. Thus, as much as
possible, increased hardware usage should be leveraged to de-
crease personnel requirements, and thus decrease total life cycle
cost.
4 Development of the Security Plan
The primary goal of the security plan is to protect the plant
from attack, preventing either damage to the containment and ra-
diological release or loss of control of the reactor. We recognize
that potential attackers could have other goals in mind, but for
this work we restrict ourselves to these. In proposing the secu-
rity plans requirements and its response elements, it is useful to
structure its development along the following phases:
(i) Establish the design basis threat (DBT)
(ii) Identify targets and target sets
(iii) Draft adversary attack scenarios
(iv) Develop a preliminary protective strategy and, from this, im-
bue the design with security components to support the strat-
egy
(v) Finally demonstrate the ability of the strategy to defend
against the DBT.
This structure is consistent with US regulatory philosophy
and for the purposes of this paper we adopt it. However we an-
ticipate that refinements are possible particularly from our future
use of risk informed arguments. In addition, in siting in coun-
tries other than the US we recognize that other regulations will
apply, although we feel that NRC regulations stand as a useful
preliminary stand-in for potential host countries regulations.
We present the following preliminary response to the first
five phases as an illustrative example based on the premise that
USNRC security regulations will be met for our OFNP:
4.1 The Design Basis Threat
The NRC Design Basis Threat requires that the security
force must be able to deal with a hostile well-trained force at-
tacking from one or more directions, supported with inside as-
sistance, and equipped with military grade weapons, equipment
and vehicles, or a vessel-borne bomb attack. An essentially sim-
ilar requirement should apply for offshore plants. The precise
specification of the NRC DBT used for land-based reactors is
classified, but would need to be also identified for an offshore
plant. The general description cited above is sufficient for this
preliminary plan.
The DBT definition also includes definition of the adver-
saries, i.e. Threat Actors– There are three major categories of po-
tential threat actors a hostile state, a sub-state or terrorist group,
and an individual. Each may have different motivations, equip-
ment, knowledge and training, and each must be considered in
the security strategy. A hostile state threat represents a conven-
tionally armed military force directly supplied by an organizing
and directing countrys government. According to NRC regu-
lations, nuclear plants do not have to defend against an attack
by an enemy of the state, by which is meant a hostile state at-
tacking with full-scale conventional forces. However the Design
Basis Threat which plants must be equipped to defend against
includes the possibility of an attack by well-equipped attacking
forces with boats and equipment, such as a unit of a states special
forces. A sub-state actor refers to a terrorist or guerilla group,
operating officially outside of the aegis of any state. Their equip-
ment and organization can vary from non-aggressive protestors
to well-trained and equipped militants. This threat should be the
main focus of security plans, as it is more likely than a hostile
state attack, and more potentially damaging than an attack by an
individual. An individual attack is an attack by a single person,
acting independently. This may be no more than a single person
without a plan, who cannot appreciably affect plant operations.
However, it is also possible that an individual attacker could be
an employee of the plant, who decides to damage the plant in
some manner from the inside. As an insider, such a person has
the opportunity and knowledge to inflict massive damage on a
plant.
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TABLE 3. THREAT AXES
Threat Origin Land-based Moored on Surface Underwater
Hostile State (i) Direct Attacks
(a) Ground Assault
(b) Bombing
(c) Surface Naval Strike
(from river)
(ii) Attacks on Infrastructure
(a) Cyber Attack
(b) Nuclear Materials in
Storage or Transit
(c) Siting-Specific Secondary
Threats (e.g. dams,
levees)
(i) Direct Attacks
(a) Boarding
(b) Bombing
(c) Surface Naval Strike
(d) Sub-surface Strike
i. Submarine/Mini-sub
ii. Divers
(ii) Attacks on Infrastructure
(a) Cyber Attack
(b) Nuclear Materials in
Storage or Transit
(c) Mines
(d) Supply Lines
(i) Direct Attacks
(a) Air-Launched Torpedo
(b) Sub-surface Strike
i. Submarine/Mini-sub
ii. Divers
(ii) Attacks on Infrastructure
(a) Cyber Attack
(b) Nuclear Materials in
Storage or Transit
(c) Mines
(d) Supply Lines
Terrorist and
Non-State
Actors
(i) Direct Attacks
(a) Ground Assault
(b) Suicide Bomber
i. Truck Bomb
ii. Airplane/Drone
(c) Standoff Attack
(Rockets/Mortars)
(ii) Attacks on Infrastructure
(a) Cyber Attack
(b) Nuclear Materials in
Storage or Transit
(c) Supply Lines
(d) Siting-Specific Secondary
Threats
(i) Direct Attacks
(a) Boarding
(b) Suicide Bomber
i. Fast Boat
ii. Diver
iii. Airplane/Drone
(c) Standoff Attack
(Rockets/Mortars)
i. Small Boat
ii. Shore Based
(d) Intentional Collision
(ii) Attacks on Infrastructure
(a) Cyber Attack
(b) Nuclear Materials in
Storage or Transit
(c) Supply Lines
(d) Mines
(i) Direct Attacks
(a) Suicide Bomber
(b) Torpedo
i. Air-Launched
ii. Sub-launched
(c) Diver
(ii) Attacks on Infrastructure
(a) Cyber Attack
(b) Nuclear Materials in
Storage or Transit
(c) Supply Lines
Insider (i) Direct Attacks
(a) Sabotage
i. Disruption of
Operations
ii. Damage
iii. Radioactive Release
(b) Explosives
i. Disruption
ii. Damage
iii. Radioactive Release
(ii) Secondary/Indirect Attacks
(a) Cyber Attack
(b) Bomb Threat
(c) Information to attackers
(i) Direct Attacks
(a) Sabotage
i. Disruption of
Operations
ii. Damage
iii. Radioactive Release
(b) Explosives
i. Disruption
ii. Damage
iii. Radioactive Release
(ii) Secondary/Indirect Attacks
(a) Cyber Attack
(b) Bomb Threat
(c) Information to attackers
(i) Direct Attacks
(a) Sabotage
i. Disruption of
Operations
ii. Damage
iii. Radioactive Release
(b) Explosives
i. Disruption
ii. Damage
iii. Radioactive Release
(ii) Secondary/Indirect Attacks
(a) Cyber Attack
(b) Bomb Threat
(c) Information to attackers
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4.2 Targets (Threat Axes)
Table 3 lists the potential ways in which different attacker
forces may attempt to attack a nuclear power plant, and how the
attempts may vary between land-based, floating, and submerged
plants.
4.3 Attack Scenarios
Here we identify those points of plant vulnerability around
which potential attack scenarios might be developed. Attackers
have the choice of several specific locations within the reactors
operational facilities that they may choose to target. An attacker
may target different sections of the plant depending on the at-
tacks motive- whether it be plant destruction, disruption, capture
or creation of a nuclear incident. Table 4 gives an overview of
points an attacker may target in a nuclear plant, based on the
goals of an attacking force.
Destruction of the plant would entail some focused attack on
the platform and structure. Disruption of the plant would result
from the attacking force targeting an operational system, such as
coolant pipes, to attempt to create a large Loss of Coolant Acci-
dent and force the plant to lose cooling capability and potentially
release radioactive material. Alternatively, they may target safety
systems, such as redundant coolant injection systems, or balance
of plant systems such as the turbine steam system, to force the
plant to shut down without risk of nuclear release. An attacker
could also attempt to capture or destroy the control room, which
could allow them to gain control over the plant. This could be
to force an intentional nuclear accident in the plant, or to merely
hold the plant for ransom or political goals, as has been done for
both oil platforms and cargo ships in the past. Finally the at-
tackers goal could involve focus on those systems or structures
housing operating nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel.
4.4 Requirements upon which to develop a prelimi-
nary protective strategy
The USNRC regulates security for terrestrial nuclear elec-
tricity generating plants principally through the requirements
of document 10CFR Part 73 with some supplements through
clarifications provided by Regulatory Guides and research
results by the NUREG report series. While it is possible that
NRC security requirements may be developed for innovative
new reactor concepts particularly ones such as this offshore
floating plant, at this time we will base our design on the existing
principal terrestrial security requirements. Although NRC
regulations may not be adopted in their entirety for the OFNP,
the basic outline serves as effective preliminary guidance to
OFNP security. Those that principally determine the protective
strategy which we will adopt are as follows. In addition we add
investment protection requirements as noted below.
TABLE 4. ATTACKER PLANT TARGETS FOR ATTACK GOAL
Target Destroy Disrupt Capture NuclearIncident
Body of
Building
X
Safety
Systems
X X X
Operational
Systems
X X
Control
Room
X X X
Shore site X X
Containment
Structure
X X
Spent Fuel
Pool X
Power
Transmission
X
Flotation
Capability
X
Regulatory requirements:
(i) The plant must be able to successfully respond to the NRC
Design Basis Threat which has been defined in 4.1
(ii) The plant must be able to deal with an insider attack with
knowledge of the plant who is either passively or actively
aiding outside attackers. Although such an insider does not
change the potential methods of attack of any given hostile
group, it adds the complication that the attacker will know
information about the layout and security of the plant, and
will be able to rely on a disruption of security by the insider.
(iii) The plant must implement a comprehensive insider mit-
igation program including items such as pre-employment
screening, psychological evaluations, drug/alcohol testing,
and supervisor behavioral observation.
(iv) The offsite force response to relieve the onsite security force
from an attack by an adversary force must be timely, for
example within a half hour.
(v) The plant must control the entry of personnel/vehicles
within the protected area (which we later label the con-
trolled access area)
Investment Protection requirements:
(vi) Ship collision - Mitigate the risks caused by a potential ship
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TABLE 5. SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES
Host-Nation OFNP Security Team
Air (i) Military Aircraft
(ii) Commercial
Aircraft
(iii) Missiles
(i) Remote Control
Drones
(ii) Light Planes
(iii) Helicopters
Surface (i) Large Tankers
(ii) Military Vessels
(i) Non-military
Surface Vessels
Sub-
Surface
(i) Large Submarines (i) Mini-subs
(torpedoes)
(ii) Divers
collision, particularly a collision with a large oil or LNG
tanker
(vii) Mitigate damage and risks caused by detonation of explo-
sives near the plant
4.5 Preliminary Protective Strategy
The initial step in developing this strategy is to identify
which security threats are the responsibility of the plant security
forces to counter and which revert to the host nation, effectively
its military capability to respond to. This division of responsibil-
ities for Air, Surface and Subsurface launched threats is defined
in Table 5.
The subsequent elements of the strategy and security com-
ponents will be presented in the balance of this paper.
5 Features Impacting Security Plan
The OFNP -300 and OFNP-1100 employ a cylindrical-hull
type design, taken from oil platform best practices. The dimen-
sions of the OFNP-300 and OFNP-1100 are reported in Table 2
in Section 2. The Central Alarm Station (CAS) will be housed in
the hull on the deck level adjacent to one of the two access points
to the platform. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the internal layout
of the cylindrical-hull platform.
The containment itself will be situated in the center of the
platform, 20 meters below the waterline in the OFNP-300 and at
the waterline for the OFNP-1100. The containment will be sur-
rounded by a dry area in an inner hull, with a flooded area further
outboard from the core. Non-vital components such as the steam
system and turbines will be sited in the turbine hall above the wa-
terline, while all safety components will be sited directly above
and around the reactor compartment and beneath the waterline.
Due to the watertight nature of levels below the waterline, the
risk of flooding is judged to be less limiting than risk of attack
FIGURE 2. INTERNAL LAYOUT OF OFNP-300
(by explosives, plane or drone crash or other methods) on com-
ponents on the upper levels. Therefore, safety components are
located below the waterline, although for redundancy important
safety components will be duplicated at different levels and sides
of the platform. The control room will be on Level 5 on both the
OFNP 300 and the OFNP 1100, only accessible directly from the
upper levels and with no direct access between the control room
and any of the operating components in this example.
In order to ensure watertight integrity in case of a breach of
the hull, the platform will be divided into six sectors, each of
which are entirely isolated from the others to ensure that a leak
in one will not compromise the rest of the platform. In addition,
the entire platform below level 3 will be watertight, with water-
tight doors on ladder-ways and internal access points. In order
to ensure personnel safety in case of a serious casualty, each sec-
tion has two access points to upper levels, in accordance with
safety best practices. All of the watertight doors will be alarmed,
monitored and access controlled from the CAS to insure they are
secured. These features, as well as ensuring watertight integrity,
will also help prevent unauthorized access to sensitive areas.
Personnel quarters will be on the deck of the platform, as
will all personnel support facilities. A helicopter pad for im-
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FIGURE 3. INTERNAL LAYOUT OF OFNP-1100
portant transport will also be situated on top of the platform, al-
though routine personnel and materials transfer will take place
by ship to a personnel transfer station on the hull of the plat-
form. The required personnel on the platform for operations and
associated maintenance will be established after the specific re-
actor plant design has been established. The plant will operate
on a three week on, three week off schedule, consistent with oil
platform practices, and there will be one personnel transfer every
week.
Along with the platform itself, the operation of the plant will
require a Secure Shore Support Facility to support functions that
cannot be handled on the platform such as personnel security
screening and food and equipment loading for transfer to the
platform. The primary function of the shore facility will be to
provide a place at which the supply ship can take on passen-
gers and supplies, while being screened by security. In addition,
the shore facility will also be the place at which the electric ca-
bles from the platform reach the shore, and the location of the
Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) required by Nuclear Regulatory
Commission regulations.
The plant will receive new supplies every week, along with
the personnel coming on and getting off the platform. In addi-
tion to food and other essentials for the crew, a supply ship will
bring any required maintenance equipment, and other minor re-
quirements. In our current design, personnel will transfer to the
hull via docking platforms near the waterline on both sides of the
hull and ladders leading to the weather deck, while materiel will
be lifted to the weather deck by crane. For significantly larger
maintenance tasks, the platform may have to be towed back to
a shipyard for longer maintenance periods. It is possible that in
further iterations of the design the supplies and personnel may
be lifted by cargo lifts outside the hull, or moved entirely by
helicopter, if those prove more effective and less expensive. In
transferring materials to the OFNP it will be essential to ensure
that they contain no contraband materials, and that their integrity
has been assured since leaving the terrestrial departure point.
Refueling is another important consideration, the strategy
for which has not been entirely yet established. There are a few
options for refueling, but the simplest, and the one that will be
considered in this paper, will be refueling on site with the spent
fuel stored in a pool onboard the platform, sized to accommodate
ten or more years of spent fuel, possibly up to the lifetime of the
plant. Another major possible option would be the movement of
spent fuel rods at some time following withdrawal from the core
to a transfer vessel, which will bring them to shore, so that spent
fuel need not be stored on the platform beyond the refueling pe-
riod for its entire life spent. However the option of removing fuel
directly from the core to a transfer vessel is likely not practical
due to the high radiation field. In any case, ultimate storage of
the spent fuel rests with the operator, and a storage site must ex-
ist that is not on board the platform unless a national spent fuel
repository exists to which spent fuel can be immediately directed
upon landing. If there are sufficient OFNPs, the vendor could
also create a needed onshore spent fuel site for fuel from multi-
ple platforms.
The refueling outage and significant maintenance activities
will involve the transport and residence for various periods of a
number of workers significantly larger than those normally on
the platform. Security protocols for their entry processing at the
Shore Support Facility and chain of custody as they are taken to
the offshore platform will need to be defined.
6 Siting and Security Layers
Both careful siting and designation of security layers con-
tribute significantly to the security plan as described next.
6.1 Siting
The OFNP will be sited within territorial waters, as illus-
trated in Figure 4. The figure also demonstrates California ship-
ping restrictions, which shows that restrictions can be imposed
upon shipping, even outside of territorial waters. The plant will
be sited at a distance from ports and major shipping lanes and
shipping restrictions around the plant will be introduced to in-
crease the time that a threat can be identified and dealt with be-
fore approaching the platform.
6.2 Security Layers
The physical layers of the security plan which have been
adopted at this time are outlined below. The layers which have
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TABLE 6. SECURITY PLAN LAYERS
Layers Area Definition Time toReaction
Time to Breach the
Security Layer Delay Stop Eliminate
1) Detection and Assessment Monitored Area andControlled Area Seconds N/A
Large Ship Exclusion Area Seconds Half hour
2) Physical Barriers Protected Area N/A Seconds to Minutes X
3) Reactor Layout Vital Area N/A Minutes X
4) Plant Security Forces
(Onboard and from Shore
Facility)
N/A Minutes Minutes to ahalf-hour X X X
5) External Response Forces N/A Half-hour N/A X X
FIGURE 4. OFNP SECURITY ZONES COMPARED TO WATER
RESTRICTION AND JURISDICTION ZONES WITH CALIFORNIA
AS A REFERENCE CASE
certain defining qualities as outlined in Table 6 are laid out as il-
lustrated in Figure 5. All of these measures are purely qualitative,
as a quantitative requirement will be plant-specific and must be
determined during the design of each individual plant. The two
relevant time qualities are time to reaction - the time it will take
for the layer to become operational and ready to meet an attack
with full strength; and time to bypass - the time it will take for
an attacker to get past the layer and reach the next portion of the
reactor defense. Table 4 provides a qualitative estimate for both
of these times. While the security forces are to entirely stop the
attacker if possible, their objective is to delay them long enough
for response forces to arrive if necessary. The response forces
goals will be to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel
sabotage, and, if that force has already entered the reactor itself,
to be able to retake captured plant areas.
The first layer of the security plan will be the detection and
assessment layer composed of the Monitored and Controlled Ac-
cess Areas as well as the Large Ship Exclusion Area. This layer
will consist of various detection devices, including radar, sonar
CCTV/ Thermal cameras and visual means of detection. The de-
tection devices will have an effective range of detection of several
nautical miles, in order to create an effective picture of the sur-
rounding waters a Monitored Area extending about 8 nm from
the plant. However, the most important area to be kept under ef-
fective observation will be the Controlled Access Area, a 360 de-
gree area of about 1000 meters around the plant, through which
maritime traffic is not cleared to enter. Anything detected within
that area will be contacted and told to veer off, and the security
forces will be brought to an alert status.
In order to protect from the possibility of collision with very
large vessels, such as tankers or freighters, a Large Ship Exclu-
sion Area is also specified. This would exclude large vessels of a
certain tonnage from a radius of at least 6 nautical miles from the
plant such that a large tanker heading towards the OFNP at 12
knots would require 30 minutes to reach the plant. Trespassing
of a large ship into this zone would trigger prompt intervention
by the host nation coast guard or military forces. The exact ton-
nage defining such a large ship categorization has yet to be de-
termined, although it will be based on sustainable damage from
collision or blast from a large tonnage ship.
The second layer of the plants security plan will be a Pro-
tected Area containing multiple physical barriers. These barriers,
consisting of booms suspended between buoys, and submarine
netting extending underneath the surface, surrounding the plant.
The diameter of this protected area will be determined by a blast
analysis using the characteristics of the design basis threat and
the inherent robustness of the platform design. This Protected
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FIGURE 5. SECURITY PLAN LAYERS
Area will have only one approved ingress point, and will serve
as a delay to any attacking force. The barriers will give the se-
curity force reaction team additional time to respond and slow
down attacking ships to make them better targets. In addition, the
physical barriers should force explosives-laden ships to detonate
at a stand-off range beyond the hull, giving the plant a greater
likelihood of survival.
The third layer of the layered defense will be the layout of
the platform itself. It will be built with the intention to make
it difficult for attackers to be able to board the plant or lethally
damage the plant from an off platform location. The exterior hull
of the plant will have 12 or 34 meters freeboard above the wa-
terline, and should be thick enough for the reactor to withstand a
blast from a medium size boat loaded with explosives detonating
at the outer boundary of the Protected Area. There should be fir-
ing positions on top of the plants hull, with firing ports and cover
for the security force to use.
The fourth layer located on the reactor plant itself - will be
the security force itself. Some members of the security force will
be on duty at all times, patrolling the top of the plant and looking
out for threats. The remaining on-board personnel will make up
a quick reaction force, able to respond to a threat within minutes.
Their goal is to stop an enemy force if possible, and if not, then
to delay the attacker until a response force from military or law
enforcement can arrive and destroy the attacking forces. The se-
curity forces will be armed with both small arms and some heavy
weaponry, to be able to defend against a small boat attack. Oth-
ers will be trained to operate radar controlled automatic weapons
for use against specified targets.
Finally, the fifth layer the plant response force based well
beyond the Monitored Area will consist of plant security forces
from the Secure Shore Support Facility eight (8) to ten (10) Nau-
tical Miles most likely backed-up by local law enforcement or
military forces, available to respond to a threat to the OFNP. The
chief of security for the plant will coordinate with this external
response force beforehand, to create a contingency plan in the
case of an attack. The external response force should be able to
arrive on site within a half hour with sufficient force to destroy
an attacker and retake the plant if necessary.
7 Key Solution Approaches
In the plant design the nuclear reactor vessel will be placed
in a containment structure housed underwater within a hull pro-
jecting from the bottom of the plant. The fuel sits behind four
steel barriers-the reactor pressure vessel, containment, reactor
hull and platform hull. Vulnerable systems sited above the sur-
face of the water include the turbines, turbine/condenser system
and some operational support systems while the primary opera-
tional and all safety-required systems will be wholly contained
in the containment structure under the surface. This forces an
attacker intending to disrupt these structures to either adopt an
underwater approach, using divers or subs, or launch an attack
through the deck of the plant, then entering the containment
structure from above. Thus, focus must be placed on design-
ing detection measures, physical barriers and the protection of
access points to the deck of the plant itself.
7.1 Strategy for Resisting Attack
The security forces must be capable of countering the se-
curity threats identified in Table 1. For meeting these security
requirements the platform would be equipped with Fighting Po-
sitions (FP) strategically positioned around the plant in order to
repel an attack by small boat and subsurface attackers. These
fighting positions would be outfitted with both lethal and non-
lethal weapons to first warn and deter a potential threat and then
stop the threat.
The physical construction of the reactor must be resistant to
explosions as well, and able to withstand or redirect the explo-
sive blast of a number of improvised explosive devices at once.
The reactor must be able to resist an explosion from outside the
controlled zone or farther out from the plant from a medium sized
ship loaded with explosives. The reactor must rely on its security
personnel to prevent explosives-laden vessels from approaching
too closely, but an explosion at a further stand-off range must be
considered as well.
To protect the reactor from capture, security personnel must
be able to delay a Design Basis Threat force to allow response
forces to arrive. The actual time for a response may vary, de-
pending on the location of the reactor, but a half hour should be
the upper allowed limit for a response from military and law en-
forcement. Although physical barriers such as submarine netting
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and floating booms will create some delay, the most important
factor in the defense of the reactor will be to use security per-
sonnel to prevent attackers from penetrating the interior of the
reactor structure long enough for a response force to arrive.
Part of the reason conventional, land-based plants possess
such large security forces is the necessity of maintaining many
constantly manned posts in order to prepare for an attack. The
longer the time between the first detection and assessment of a
potential attacker and the point at which they reach the platform,
the lower the number of constantly manned posts necessary for
successful security of the offshore plant. The semi-monthly per-
sonnel rotation schedule of the plant means that the security per-
sonnel who are not on watch will nonetheless still be on the plat-
form. Those members of the security force who are not at their
post at any given time will thus still be able to respond and hence
must retain their fitness for duty status at all times while at the
plant. When an alert is given, they will have time to prepare for
the attack, even if they are not at their post at the time. Therefore,
another way to reduce personnel requirements, and thus costs,
will be to increase the time between detection, assessment and
contact, both by increased detection ranges and by delaying tac-
tics which slow down a potential attacker.
7.2 Security Force Composition
The security force has two components. The first compo-
nent is the primary security team, consisting of armed officers
patrolling the deck and the shore site. The primary security team
would have the responsibility for security of the reactor, security
of the shore facility, and processing plant personnel transiting to
and from the plant at the secure shore support facility. The sec-
ond component is the technical security team, who man the Cen-
tral Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)
and monitor detection equipment. The technical security team
has responsibility for monitoring and maintenance of detection
equipment including sonar, radar, CCTV and UAV systems. The
number of security force members on the platform at any time
depends on two factors the number of security force members
needed on watch at any given time, and how often they are ex-
pected to stand watch.
The primary on-watch team is intended to provide back-up
visual detection to the detection equipment, and to provide initial
response actions to an intrusion before the reaction force (con-
sisting of all other members of the security team on the platform)
arrives in response to a threat.. Therefore, the minimum security
force on watch for the primary security team on the platform will
be based on the amount of deck area they are expected to cover
visually, and the initial response actions required. It is antici-
pated that deck area coverage will be the controlling factor for
establishment of the watch numbers.
The technical on-watch team is intended to monitor the de-
tection equipment to provide initial warning of an intrusion.
NRC regulations require a minimum of two officers in both the
CAS and SAS. Although NRC guidelines will not necessarily be
binding on an OFNP sited in another country, they nonetheless
offer a useful illustration of possible required number of person-
nel.. The minimum of two anticipates one operator manning the
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which would include radar,
sonar and other detection measures, while the second monitors
other systems not included in IDS as well as related duties such
as access control into restricted and vital areas. Since many of
these related duties will be significantly simplified in the OFNP,
because access to restricted and vital areas involves entering con-
centric circles rather than individual buildings, it may be reason-
able to only require one officer in the CAS.
The second factor in total numbers of security personnel is
the number of off-watch personnel needed to support any given
amount of on-watch personnel. The on watch personnel only
stand watch for some pre-specified part of the day, which means
replacements are necessary for them. If we split the security
force into teams of the minimum on-watch security personnel
discussed above, then there must be a number of teams suffi-
cient to have meet the watch schedule while allowing sufficient
rest and down-time to ensure adequate attentiveness. In addi-
tion, extra personnel should be present to provide sufficient al-
lowance for emergencies, medical casualties and other extraordi-
nary events.
Security at the shore site for the plant will be easier to en-
sure than for a land-based plant. First of all, the cycle sched-
ule for plant workers, who live on the platform for weeks at a
time, will reduce the number of personnel moving into and out
of security-protected areas each day. Instead, there will be well-
anticipated large personnel movements every few weeks, during
which security requirements will be higher. Secondly, the shore
site contains no Vital Areas or high risk areas, and therefore can
utilize a lower level of security requirements than either the plat-
form or an equivalent land-based facility. Thirdly, the shore sites
perimeter will be much shorter than that of a land-based plant,
also reducing personnel requirements. The shore sites security
requirements will be based primarily on normal physical secu-
rity for warehouses or other less well protected sites, and consists
merely of sufficient officers to notice and deter intruders.
An example security force for the OFNP-300 would be 40
officers in total. In this example force, cross-trained primary se-
curity force officers operate the CAS on board the plant instead
of dedicated technical operators. The members of the primary se-
curity team totaling 30 officers would alternate duty on the plant
and at the shore facility, spending 2-3 weeks at each. Of these 20
officers will be at the plant at all times. The remaining 10 offi-
cers of the primary security team would be acting as security of
the shore facility, training or leave. The technical team of 10 offi-
cers, based at the shore facility to reduce the costs of basing more
personnel offshore, monitors the sensors and detection devices at
the SAS and performs preventative and corrective maintenance
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TABLE 7. COMPOSITION AND ROLES OF OFFICERS OF THE
EXAMPLE SECURITY FORCE
Role Responders on
Plant Site
Responders at
Shore Site
Total
Force
Primary
Security
20 (2 officer team
on patrol duty each
8 hour shift, 2
officer team on
duty at the Primary
Alarm Station each
8 hour shift, 5
teams)
10 (2 officer
team on
patrol duty
each 8 hour
shift, 5 teams)
30
Technical
Specialists
0 10 (2 officer
team on duty
at the
Secondary
Alarm Station
each 8 hour
shift, 5 teams)
10
on SAS and CAS equipment.
Two of the primary security team would be on watch each
eight hour shift each patrolling a 180 degree perimeter section
of the plant. At the same time, two more would be on watch
each eight hour shift in the Central Alarm Station, monitoring
the detection devices, thus also reducing costs by reducing the
number of personnel necessary on the offshore platform.
The members of the security team based at the plant would
live onboard the plant, ensuring that the plant has a sixteen-man
rapid reaction force available at all times. With the use of effec-
tive remote sensing devices, the security team would have suf-
ficient warning for timely response by all the onboard security
personnel. Table 7 identifies the composition and roles of offi-
cers of this example security force for the OFNP-300.
The Security Force enhancement necessary for the larger
OFNP-1100 would require about double the complement of the
OFNP-300. This is predicated on scaling the size of the Primary
Security officer complement by the perimeter ratio of these two
sized plants which is 75m/45m= 1.67 or rounded to 2. For the
Primary Security officers at the shore site who primarily process
workers and materials transiting between the shore site and the
offshore platform, scale by plant power rating which is 1100 /
300=3.7 or reduced to 3.5. Hence the resulting number of exam-
ple Primary Security officers becomes 40 on the plant site and
35 at the shore site. The number of technical specialists remains
at 10 yielding a total example force of about 85 officers for the
OFNP-1100 based on the example for the OFNP-300 developed
above
7.3 Security Equipment
There are three types of equipment which could be utilized
by the OFNP security force: detection equipment, to monitor the
area around the plant to detect and identify potential hostiles;
physical barriers and defenses, which are included to delay at-
tackers and reduce damage in case of explosive detonation; and
finally, weapons, both lethal and non-lethal, intended to, first,
deter an attacker from approaching, and second, to fend off or
eliminate the threat.
The minimum criterion for the detection system is the ne-
cessity to detect a potentially hostile activity with sufficient time
for the reaction force on board the platform to come on deck to
protect the plant. In addition, the detection system should have
sufficient range to ensure that the time from identifying a hostile
to the response team from a naval base or other military/coast
guard installation is minimized. Different potential hostiles will
have different approach speeds and different ranges at which they
can be detected and identified by the platform detection system,
so the detection equipment should be based on the limiting case,
which could be either drones or submarines Due to the circum-
stances of a land-based plant, hostile detection can for the most
part only take place on land owned by the plant, using such mea-
sures as Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) and thermal cameras and
motion sensors to monitor the perimeter of the plant. By con-
trast, an offshore plant has 360 degree of vision, and can monitor
areas far out from the plant.
The following describes an example case of a detection sys-
tem. The example plant will be equipped to detect vessels up
to 24 nautical miles (by radar), detect and assess small craft up
to 8 nautical miles (by radar and long range CCTV and ther-
mal camera system) and divers to 3 nautical miles from the plant
(by sonar buoys). The radar would be equipped with Automatic
Identification System (AIS) to be able to identify commercial
shipping traffic within the 24 nautical mile range. This detection
range of 8 to 24 nautical miles will allow a full 12 to 36 minutes
from detection to arrival at the physical barrier (the boundary of
the Protected Area) to which is added multiple minutes of de-
lay needed for the attacking force to breach the physical barrier,
which we tentatively estimate as 18-30 minutes as discussed be-
low. Thus the total time for the attacking force to reach the plant
from initial detection is 30 to slightly over an hour for a vessel
travelling at 40 knots directly at the plant. In that time, the exter-
nal response force from both the shore facility and host country
military and law enforcement will be able to respond if called
upon. For the slower vessels that we anticipate as more likely,
the time is increased significantly.
The plant will also have eight (8) passive acoustic buoys
floating approximately 1.5 nautical miles from the plant. The
passive acoustic buoys will have a passive sonar system with the
ability to detect a small submersible or a diver at a range of ap-
proximately 1.5 nautical miles. The passive sonar-buoys have
a lifetime of several years, with a requirement for maintenance
12 Copyright © 2016 by ASME
Downloaded From: http://proceedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/ on 07/16/2018 Terms of Use: http://www.asme.org/about-asme/terms-of-use
about every three months. Eight (8) passive sonar-buoys would
provide overlapping coverage of the area around the plant out to
3 nautical miles even when one sonar-buoy undergoes mainte-
nance. In practice, the machinery noise of the platform limits the
interior detection to approximately 0.5 nm from the plant.
If active sonar is used, four (4) active sonar buoys could be
located approximately 0.5 nm from the OFNP. At the current
time the maximum range for the active sonar to pick up divers
is between 600m to 1000m (0.32 to 0.54 nm). Therefore, the
sonar buoys will be able to detect divers between about 0.2 and
0.8 nm from the plant at the least, and 0 to 1 nm if conditions are
favorable.
Automated analysis of sonar data may further reduce per-
sonnel costs, since the plant Central Alarm Station (CAS) will
not require dedicated sonar technicians to detect contacts. Of
course, the security personnel in the CAS will still monitor the
raw sonar data as a backup to the automated detection system,
but there will not be a need for a separate sonar technician. An
algorithm for automatic flagging of sonar contacts which will fit
the requirements of the offshore platform very well has recently
been developed [11].
In addition to electronic detection means such as sonar and
radar, the plant will also use unmanned vehicles for detection and
identification of contacts. The unmanned vehicles will help with
redundancy in detection means. More importantly, however, they
will be able to identify a potential threat and therefore determine
appropriate responses earlier. They will be able to approach an
alarming contact and determine whether the contact is a threat
that must be responded to with lethal force, non-lethal force,
or merely warned away. The unmanned vehicles may be air-
borne vehicles, but water unmanned vehicles will be less costly
and equally effective for the purposes required. Using unmanned
vessels for the purpose of re-directing or deflecting an incoming
vessel from its course, or an airborne attack by a small aircraft or
drone, is also contemplated, and may help decrease the threat of
air attack or collision.
In order to further delay a threat and allow the security force
time to respond, physical barriers around the plant will delay a
potential attacker to allow an effective response. These barriers
will take two formsbooms from and around the plant defining the
perimeter of the Protected Area and the design of the plant itself.
The criteria for the outer layer of booms is to stop a medium-
sized ship at a sufficient distance that an explosion would do
negligible structural damage to the plant. Effective layout of the
plant, such as ingress points and the placement of the ladder ways
into the interior of the plant, will serve to delay attackers as much
as possible, and the plant itself will be hardened against explo-
sions, as mentioned above, to prevent containment breaches or
damage to the integrity of the plant if an explosion or collision
is used by an attacker to try to damage the plant. The criteria for
the plant design is to withstand a collision of a large ship and an
explosion from a small boat alongside the plant. Equipment to
move the plant out of the way of a collision or explosion, such as
specially designed mooring lines or dynamic positioning units,
will also be considered in the future.
In an example case, the physical floating barrier around the
plant, having a 3 m elevation above the water and holding net-
ting below them which will wrap around the underside of the
plant, serve the main purpose of delaying both small, fast boats
and larger craft. The physical barrier is intended to delay an at-
tacker for the maximum time possible, and we will confirm the
estimated delay time of between 18 and 30 minutes when more
specific barrier design characteristics can be established. This
delay of any attacking craft will give the security forces on board
the platform time to respond.
Finally, the OFNP will require systems to actively deter,
stand-off and potentially destroy attackers. This includes both
lethal and non-lethal weapons as well as warning systems. The
criteria for the non-lethal and warning systems will be the ability
to reach a potential aggressor in the Controlled Access Area and
deter them from approaching closer. These systems are intended
to differentiate between active hostile intent and non-lethal intent
such as demonstrators. The lethal weapons systems (currently
under NRC Section 161A Authorized Weapons, the largest ap-
proved weapon is the 50 caliber machine gun) would be able to
destroy small boats of up to approximately 20 feet and damage
and redirect larger vessels. In addition, there must be sufficient
small arms to engage multiple teams of attackers.
There are a number of non-lethal systems available which
can first warn approaching vessels or aircraft/drones of their en-
try into our Controlled Air Space/Access Area and then can be
employed as a further deterrent to their continued penetration
into this Area towards the plant platform. These systems include
a Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) for acoustic hailing and
as a sonic weapon, a Long Range (3/4 mi) LASER that can daz-
zle the crew of an approaching vessel so they are unable to aim
weapons, the USNAVYs Long Range Ocular Interrupter (LROI)
a bright beam of visible light with varying intensity for which
low is for visual warning and high for temporary visual suppres-
sion and an Active Denial System (ADS) which shoots beams
of millimeter waves which heat up the intruder within three (3)
seconds which highly motivates escape behavior (the Raytheon
Silent Guardian uses this type of technology). The LRAD system
is offered within an integrated Radar, Thermal and CCTV system
by the ECSIs Anti-Piracy solution package. In addition to de-
terrence, disabling the propulsion or steering of an approaching
vessel may be an attractive way to reduce their effectiveness as
well as fend off non-lethal attackers. Unmanned vehicles could
allow targeted attacks on steering or propellers, and potentially
boarding an approaching vessel could be an option as well.
Potential lethal weapons packages include 9mm hand gun,
semi- automatic assault rifles, short and long barrel 12 gauge shot
guns, .30 caliber rifle and enhanced weapons such as standard
radar controlled .50 caliber machine guns.
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8 Costs
Security is a large cost in modern reactors, due to increased
requirements since 9/11. The three major cost-factors for the
security of the OFNP will be personnel, hardware and mainte-
nance, in that order. At this stage of our design personnel costs
will be the highest contributor to security cost, as is true for se-
curity on land-based plants. Unfortunately, personnel costs per
person will rise for an offshore plant, due to both the cost in-
crease for a member of the platform security force compared to
a land-based plant member and also partly due to the transporta-
tion costs associated with getting him and his sustenance to the
platform and back again. This means that personnel costs will
be the highest expense of the security plan, unless the personnel
requirement can be sufficiently reduced.
The annual salary of an offshore platform nuclear secu-
rity officer can be estimated, based on the salary of a conven-
tional nuclear security officer and the salary of an oil platform
worker. The annual salary of a nuclear security officer ranges
from around $50,000 to $70,000. By contrast, the annual salary
of an oil platform worker is closer to $100,000. We will assume
that the annual salary of the security personnel for the plant will
be approximately $100,000, like an oil rig operator. In the ex-
ample developed above, the OFNP-300 plant will have a total of
approximately 40 security personnel, which means that the per-
sonnel cost for the security personnel will be $4 million/year.
Hardware costs will also be a cost-driver, although they will
contribute less than personnel costs. Unlike personnel costs, the
hardware costs for the OFNP-1100 version should not increase
appreciably with the larger platform. Required small arms will
increase proportionally with security force numbers, but the in-
crease in size will not necessitate more purchases of sonar buoys
or radar systems. There will be a greater requirement for physical
barriers, but the increase should not be significant. The estimated
costs for each are shown in Table 8.
Hardware costs include both the one-time costs of purchas-
ing equipment such as weapons and detection equipment (shown
in Table 8 as $1.685 million if passive sonar is used) and the se-
curity monitoring equipment of $1.65 Million. This totals to a
security cost of $3.335 Million, lower than the yearly recurring
personnel cost of $4 million/year.
Finally, maintenance costs are harder to account for, but
to a large extent, they can be folded into the total maintenance
costs of the platform. The main maintenance intensive pieces of
hardware will be the alarm stations and their command and con-
trol equipment, and the sonar-buoys and radar systems. Since
the maintenance labor is accounted for in the technical secu-
rity force, then a workable, conservative rule of thumb is to
use 15% of initial equipment costs as an annual equipment re-
pair/or replacement estimate. Factors such as warranty and ob-
solescence which are cost contributors over the 60 year life cycle
of the plant are included in this estimate. Hence we estimate the
maintenance cost for those pieces of equipment as approximately
TABLE 8. ESTIMATED COSTS OF SECURITY EQUIPMENT
Equipment Cost ($1000s)
Weapons and Detection
Equipment:
Total: 1685 (passive sonar)
or 2715 (active sonar)
CCTV and Thermal Cameras 35
Radar (with AIS) 250
Passive Sonar Buoys +
Control 610
Active Sonar Buoys + Control 1640
Unmanned Vehicles assume 100 (for four units)
Physical Barriers 600
Non-lethal Weapons (LRAD,
LOI, ADS) 50
Lethal Weapons 40 for 30 man force
Security Monitoring
Equipment: Total: 1650
CAS and SAS 500
Plant Internal Spaces 150
Shore Site 1000
$530,000/year. Thus, rounding slightly, the overall cost of the se-
curity for the OFNP-300 will total a one-time hardware cost of
$3.3 million, with a further annual personnel and maintenance
cost of $4.5 million. This gives an annual cost of 0.155/kWh for
the OFNP-300, a 300 MWe reactor operating at a 90% capacity
factor. The one-time cost, normalized to plant life, will be about
0.013/kWh, assuming a 10 year equipment lifetime. Compar-
atively, the annual security cost for the three pressurized water
reactor units operated by Xcel Energy in Minnesota in 2010 was
$25.5 million according to public documents, which do not, how-
ever, provide a breakdown of cost elements [12]. The three units
were rated 585 MWe (since up-rated to 670MWe), 550 MWe and
550 MWe respectively, totaling 1.7 GWe. This gives an annual
cost of 0.192 cents/kWh for security of the Xcel reactors, a value
close to the estimate above for the OFNP-300. Based on the esti-
mates above, the OFNP-1100 security costs will only increase by
a factor of two or less, while the electricity output is more than
tripled. Thus, the security cost per MWe for the OFNP-1100 will
be significantly lower than that for other plants of comparable
size, at least according to easily available cost data and the rough
scaling factor expressed in the previous section.
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9 Future Work
Significantly more work will be needed to further detail the
security of the OFNP. Firstly, work must be done on less well
studied threats, including underwater threats, possible attacks
from drones or unmanned vehicles, and the possibility of col-
lision. Work is currently in process using industry knowledge
and collision modeling software to assess the collision threat and
possible responses or mitigation, such as using mooring lines or
dynamic positioning units to move the platform out of the way of
a collision. Initial analysis has also been done on the underwa-
ter threat, tentatively investigating possibilities including the use
of torpedoes to destroy incoming threats, unmanned underwater
vehicles and physical barriers such as netting. However, more
work will still help clarify useful responses and their costs.
Secondly, the security plan needs to be expanded to include
non-standard conditions, particularly refueling and other major
maintenance operations which necessitate larger and less stan-
dardized personnel movements. These will be developed in par-
allel with iterations in the operational strategy for refueling and
major maintenance operations. Such situations should mainly in-
volve dealing with an increased number of personnel, and there-
fore will be only quantitatively, not qualitatively, different from
normal operations.
Thirdly, the threat environment and government support
should be analyzed in different potential platform sites. For ex-
ample basing the platform off the coast of the United States will
impose different security requirements than basing it off Singa-
pore, due to different potential threats, different levels of govern-
ment support and potentially different regulatory environments.
When operating an actual OFNP these differences will need to be
taken into account, and although the specific conditions may not
be definable with accuracy now, work can be done on estimating
the differences that may occur in different conditions. Finally,
work must be done to further specify the exact personnel and
equipment requirements through further iteration of design and
requirements. Requirements may be reduced through adoption
of additional hardware solutions or from further analysis of the
security conditions.
10 Conclusions
The most difficult security scenario to deal with is a scenario
in which the attackers are trying to damage the plant, not capture
it. In particular, an offshore plant faces the relatively unique vul-
nerability compared to a land-based plant that it can be sunk,
whether by an explosion, a ship collision, or both. Further ex-
amination and analysis is needed to determine the best responses
to an attack by a suicide bombing attack, remote control drone
attack, or an intentional ship collision, but the major concepts of
the response are captured here delay of the attacking force and
protection of the containment.
The initial estimate in this paper of security cost for the
OFNP-300 of 0.155 cents/kWh for the offshore plant is slightly
lower than that for a 3 unit PWR land based station for which
costs have been reported publicly and quoted in this paper. Due
to security concerns, however, publicly available information
does not include numbers of security personnel or other, more
detailed information. Land based Nuclear Power Stations have
not addressed air attack by drones and nor yet have we but may
further investigate the subject in the future.
Cost-savings are mainly accessible if compensatory means
can be designed to achieve reduction in the security force re-
quired for the plant since as confirmed in Section VII, the one-
time hardware costs are relatively minimal. They amount to less
than one year of security annual expenditures, and thus are very
small compared to the personnel costs. Ideally, a further person-
nel reduction could be occasioned by larger hardware spending.
Finally we stress that the security plan we have presented
is merely an example of how the assumed design requirements
might be responded to. Further consideration is required before
we will have reached the stage of sufficient understanding of the
security threats as well as the most effective licensing framework
for this application to be definite in recommending a definitive
security plan for the OFNP. In this regard an ambitious challenge
contemplated for study is the development and exercise of a risk-
informed security strategy to replace the deterministically-based
current USNRC regulatory structure which has been assumed as
the required design basis for the security plan presented in this
paper.
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